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EVERY GRAIN OF SAND: WOULD A JUDICIAL
TAKINGS DOCTRINE FREEZE THE COMMON
LAW OF PROPERTY?
DAVID S. WHEELOCK †
ABSTRACT
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court
endorsed the proposition that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment might operate as a constraint not only on executive and
legislative action, but also on judicial decisions. In a federal system in
which property rights are established almost exclusively by state law,
and in which the meaning of state law is determined by state courts,
the notion of judicial takings raises several difficult questions. The
question that is the province of this Note is whether a doctrine of
judicial takings might somehow inhibit the development of the
common law of property in state courts. This Note identifies two
principal mechanisms by which that inhibiting effect might occur.
First, the Court might insist on enshrining an authorized definition of
constitutional property with certain approved, substantive features
rather than simply leaving the content of property rights to be defined
by state law. Second, the Court might ostensibly leave the
development of property law to state courts while nevertheless
adopting an overly aggressive posture in reviewing state property-law
decisions: it might, in other words, be swift to hold that a state court
decision had affirmatively changed, rather than merely explicated, the
state law of property. This Note concludes that although the first
possibility is nominally foreclosed by the Court’s commitment to
positivism, when reviewing especially difficult or novel property cases
the Court may nevertheless be tempted to patch together a definition
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of property that borrows from the traditional substance of the
common law. And although the second possibility is not an
implausible one, Stop the Beach Renourishment suggested that
plaintiffs in judicial takings challenges should bear the burden of
establishing the prior existence of the allegedly extinguished property
right. That suggestion, this Note argues, may ultimately preserve a
great deal of interpretive freedom for state courts in adjudicating lesssettled questions of property law. The Court’s choices in these delicate
areas will ultimately dictate whether judicial takings either preserves
or imperils the common law of property.

INTRODUCTION
1

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been described
2
as “a last lonely bulwark of property rights.” It is, at bottom, an
obstinate limit on the government’s ability to alter private-property
3
entitlements without shouldering the burden of repayment. But the
clause’s meaning and operation are complicated by the fact that
property rights within the constitutional system are understood to be
4
largely a function of state law. Given the accepted role of the state
5
courts in defining state law, and given that even the most cautious
property-rights advocates acknowledge the capacity of state common
6
law to change over time, the question naturally announces itself:
Might a state court interpretation of state property law venture so far
afield from established precedent as to constitute a “taking” of
property in its own right? In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
2. Landgate, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188, 1212 (Cal. 1998) (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1990)
(asserting that the Fifth Amendment serves to “limit the degree to which legislative and
executive bodies can reshuffle property rights without compensating injured property holders”).
4. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 487
(6th ed. 2009) (“The cases take the view that, in general, the question whether a ‘property’
interest exists is governed by state law.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 917–22 (2000) (discussing the ascendancy of the Supreme Court’s
reliance on state law to define property).
5. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 611–12 (1874).
6. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years
After Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 23–24 (2008) (recognizing some flexibility in the articulation of
the common law but arguing for a “demand-side” approach informed by social custom rather
than a “supply-side” approach dictated by policy preferences).
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Florida Department of Environmental Protection, decided in 2010, a
8
plurality of the Supreme Court responded in the affirmative. Judicial
9
takings, once a topic upon which scholars only speculated, suddenly
emerged as a live field of inquiry.
Notwithstanding the plurality’s firmness in recognizing judicial
takings, Stop the Beach Renourishment inspired no small degree of
confusion as to whether the concept might eventually be endorsed by
10
a majority of the Court and as to what form a judicial takings
11
doctrine might assume in that event. This Note strives to bring some
organization to the discussion by focusing on a specific problem
raised by Stop the Beach Renourishment: the prospect that a judicial
takings doctrine might inhibit the ongoing development of the
common law of property in state courts. Critics have raised this issue
in response to the plurality opinion without engaging in a great deal
12
of elaboration. As this Note emphasizes, the concern over freezing
the common law does have a substantial genealogy within the Court’s
jurisprudence, one that makes the accusation especially germane to
13
the plurality’s exposition of judicial takings. The ambition of this
Note is to assess the merits of that accusation more thoroughly.
Part I sketches a brief doctrinal pedigree of judicial takings, with
a special eye trained on the potential of a judicial takings doctrine to
inhibit the development of the common law of property. First, Part
I.A seeks to define the central problem with greater precision. It
7. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
8. See id. at 2601 (plurality opinion) (“It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial
decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”).
9. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1451 (“Whether the takings protections constrain the
judiciary in the same manner that they restrict the other branches of government is a crucial
question today.”).
10. See Richard Ruda, Essay, Do We Really Need a Judicial Takings Doctrine?, 35 VT. L.
REV. 451, 451 (2010) (“There is . . . no need for the Supreme Court to adopt a new takings
doctrine that substantially alters the federal-state balance by making federal courts the arbiters
of state property law.”); Daniel L. Siegel, Essay, Why We Will Probably Never See a Judicial
Takings Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 459, 460 (2010) (“[I]t is highly doubtful that on closer
examination a majority of the current Justices would ever embrace the doctrine.”).
11. See Robert H. Thomas, Mark M. Murakami & Tred R. Eyerly, Essay, Of Woodchucks
and Prune Yards: A View of Judicial Takings from the Trenches, 35 VT. L. REV. 437, 442 (2010)
(proposing “a roadmap for analyzing judicial takings claims”).
12. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 261 (2011), http://yalelaw
journal.org/2011/2/18/mulvaney.html (arguing that extending judicial takings to cover the
adjudication of rights between private parties would “freeze[] evolution of the common law of
property absent compensation”); Siegel, supra note 10, at 465 (“[A] judicial takings doctrine
would ignore the evolving nature of the common law.”).
13. See infra Part I.A.
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styles the problem as a conversation between Justice Scalia and
Justice Stevens that originated in the Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas
14
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, and it further explains why the
conversation had a natural forum in the pages of Stop the Beach
Renourishment. Part I.B then presents the procedural history and the
various opinions from Stop the Beach Renourishment.
In Parts II and III, this Note engages with two basic ways in
which a judicial takings doctrine, if indeed adopted by the Court,
might freeze the common law of property. Part II focuses on what is
perhaps best described as the substantive task of identifying property.
It inquires whether the Court might be willing to enshrine a specific
normative definition of property as a constitutional baseline in
takings cases by giving recognition to certain kinds of common-law
property principles but not to others. Part II suggests that “property”
in the Takings Clause is likely to continue to be defined by state
positive law, but that the Court may reserve some body of general
common law as a definitional failsafe. Part III, by comparison, seeks
to ascertain what procedural approach the Court might take in
evaluating judicial takings claims regardless of how property is
substantively defined. Using Stop the Beach Renourishment as an
imperfect guide, it inquires into what extent, and under what
conditions, the Court might be read to permit state courts to modify
or reinterpret common-law principles of property without triggering
the Fifth Amendment’s compensation requirement. The plurality’s
discussion contained mixed signals: some of the Justices seem to
counsel a deferential approach, whereas others might be read to
encourage judicial discipline.
The two categories of analysis represented by Parts II and III will
almost certainly overlap in places. Underlying each of them, after all,
is the sensitive challenge of devising a path that will both preserve the
Takings Clause as a meaningful feature of the Constitution and honor
the state courts’ position as the final expositors of state property law.
Vexing though that challenge may be, a judicial takings doctrine that
does not attempt to resolve it is liable to resemble a “bewildering
15
mess,” as neither litigants nor state courts will have any reliable
means of predicting exactly when a commonplace property dispute

14. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
15. James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1997)
(summarizing the confusion over the Court’s regulatory-takings jurisprudence).
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might rise to the level of a constitutional claim. At the very least,
this Note aims to illuminate some of the tensions that will
predominate in any nascent judicial takings regime, in the modest
hope that the future architects—or excavators—of such a regime
might do their work by a brighter candle.
I. A DOCTRINAL PEDIGREE OF JUDICIAL TAKINGS
On their face, the opinions in Stop the Beach Renourishment
disclose significant disagreements among the Justices about the
potential operation of the Takings Clause on judicial action. Those
opinions, and indeed the broader history of the case, are worthy of
attention in their own right. But exactly what the notion of judicial
takings might mean for the future of the common law of property
cannot fully be appreciated without first visiting an earlier exchange.
A. The Fear of Freezing the Common Law
Nearly twenty years prior to Stop the Beach Renourishment, in
Lucas, the Court first gave formal recognition to the categorical rule
that the Takings Clause requires compensation whenever a regulation
denies a landowner “all economically beneficial or productive use of
17
land.” The specific regulation challenged in Lucas was a South
Carolina law that prohibited the erection of habitable structures on
beachfront property seaward of a line fixed by the designated state
18
agency. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the
statute effected no taking of beachfront property, and therefore
required no compensation of beachfront property owners because it
simply proscribed a harmful or noxious use of the land, thereby
19
falling well within the accepted scope of the state’s police power.

16. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2619 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring) (cautioning that the plurality’s position might spur a
multitude of constitutional challenges to state court rulings).
17. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. As the Court acknowledged, this categorical rule was a
departure from the “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” that had long been understood to
precede any requirement of compensation under the Court’s prior takings jurisprudence. Id.
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
18. Id. at 1008–09.
19. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 900 (S.C. 1991) (“[T]he fact remains
that the Supreme Court has time and again held that when a State merely regulates use, and acts
to prevent a serious public harm, there is no ‘taking’ for which compensation is due.”), rev’d,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Lucas majority, responded to this
conclusion by attaching an important corollary to the Court’s newly
adopted per se rule: when a government regulation prohibits all
economically beneficial use of land, the government may avoid
compensating the landowner only by showing that the landowner did
20
not enjoy any right to undertake that use in the first place. That
showing, Scalia’s opinion noted, must be supported by reference to
whichever “background principles of the State’s law of property and
nuisance” already imposed substantive limitations on the landowner’s
21
title.
To a dissenting Justice Stevens, the Lucas Court’s reliance on the
ability of background principles alone to limit compensation under
22
the Takings Clause was misplaced. The mere fact that a government
regulation renders impermissible what may have been a permissible
use of property under the previous state of the law, Stevens
contended, should not by itself create a basis for compensation under
23
the Takings Clause. Rather, Stevens’s dissent emphasized the
principle that state governments, in regulating private property rights,
ought to be afforded some flexibility to respond to new social
24
emergencies and to serve the evolving needs of the public. The
principal transgression of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, according
to Stevens, was that it “[froze] the State’s common law, denying the
legislature much of its traditional power to revise the law governing
25
the rights and uses of property.” Lest that folly escape the
appropriate measure of condemnation, Stevens did not hesitate, in
language borrowed from Justice Marshall, to invoke the specter of
26
Lochner v. New York, a decision redolent of a jurisprudential era

20. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
21. Id. at 1029.
22. See id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that legislatures “must often revise
the definition of property and the rights of property owners”).
23. See id. at 1068 (“One must wonder if government will be able to ‘go on’ effectively if it
must risk compensation ‘for every such change in the general law.’” (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922))).
24. See id. at 1069 (“More than a century ago we recognized that ‘the great office of
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the
changes of time and circumstances.’” (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877))).
25. Id. at 1068–69.
26. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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“when common-law rights were also found immune from revision by
27
State or Federal Government.”
The tenor of Justice Stevens’s dissent in Lucas made all the more
noteworthy his absence from the deliberations in Stop the Beach
28
Renourishment, a decision in which Stevens took no part. Although
all eight participating Justices agreed that the Florida Supreme Court
had not violated the Takings Clause by deciding against private29
property owners in their challenge to a state erosion-control statute,
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion took the significant step of asserting
that a judicial decision might conceivably amount to a taking within
30
the meaning of the clause. The plurality’s willingness to recognize
31
judicial takings occasioned some trepidation from Justices Kennedy
32
and Breyer, who penned separate concurrences. But neither
concurring opinion was quite so strident in evaluating Scalia’s
arguments as to sound Stevens’s prior alarm against “freez[ing] the
33
State’s common law.”
27. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
28. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2613
(2010). Although Justice Stevens gave no explanation for his recusal and no recusal motion was
filed, before argument one of the amici curiae discovered and circulated documents indicating
that Stevens owned a condominium property in Fort Lauderdale “within a renourishment zone
similar to the property at issue in the case.” Tony Mauro, Behind Justice Stevens’ Recusal in
Florida Case, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009, 1:41 PM), http://legaltimes.
typepad.com/blt/2009/12/behind-justice-stevens-recusal-in-florida-case.html.
29. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2613 (plurality opinion).
30. See id. at 2602 (“[T]he Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property
without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking.”).
31. See id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (contending that the Court need not
determine “whether, or when, a judicial decision” might violate the Takings Clause and noting
“certain difficulties that should be considered” before recognizing judicial takings).
32. See id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he plurality unnecessarily addresses
questions of constitutional law that are better left for another day.”).
33. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1068 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy seemed merely to suggest that the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1, would be better suited than the Takings Clause to guard against judicial
encroachments on private property. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Due Process Clause, in both its substantive and procedural
aspects, is a central limitation upon the exercise of judicial power.”). His concurrence was, at
most, ambivalent toward the proposition that either state legislatures or state courts require any
extraordinary degree of flexibility in shaping common-law background principles of property.
See id. (“State courts generally operate under a common-law tradition that allows for
incremental modifications to property law, but ‘this tradition cannot justify a carte blanch [sic]
judicial authority to change property definitions wholly free of constitutional limitations.’”
(quoting Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings,
and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 435 (2001))). Justice Breyer, for his part, was at
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Several considerations suggest that, had Justice Stevens been
given the chance to reprise that alarm in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, he would have done so. For one thing, the majority
opinion from which Stevens had so vigorously dissented in Lucas
itself foreshadowed Justice Scalia’s future acknowledgment of judicial
takings: in a final footnote in Lucas, Scalia cautioned that a state
court could not be so expansive in its interpretation of background
property-law principles as to depart from “an objectively reasonable
34
application of relevant precedents.” Additionally, Stevens’s Lucas
35
dissent was rhetorically indebted to Justice Marshall’s concurrence
36
in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, a case in which Marshall
argued that extending Takings Clause doctrine to elevate the
common-law right of exclusion above the right to free speech would
potentially “freeze the common law” and plunge the Court back into
37
the days of Lochner. When Scalia defended the notion of judicial
takings in Stop the Beach Renourishment, he cited PruneYard as
accommodating the very proposition that Marshall rebelled against:
that an uncompensated judicial revision of private property rights
38
might be struck down as violating the Takings Clause. That Stevens
might have condemned Scalia’s reasoning on the same grounds first
staked out by Marshall is, therefore, not implausible.
But a reprisal of Justice Stevens’s Lucas dissent would have been
pertinent to Stop the Beach Renourishment in the far more
fundamental sense that the concept of judicial takings, if it is indeed
to subsist as a cognizable feature of the Court’s Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence, will ultimately demand some resolution of the proper
role of the common law in defining the background principles of
property. After all, Lucas spoke only to the ability of legislatures to

least somewhat solicitous of the possibility that a judicial takings doctrine might entail “federal
interference in matters that are primarily the subject of state law,” but he did not appear to
endorse any particular view of how mutable private property rights ought to be. Id. at 2618–19
(Breyer, J., concurring).
34. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18.
35. See id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Such an approach would freeze the common
law as it has been constructed by the courts, perhaps at its 19th-century state of development.”
(quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
36. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
37. Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., concurring).
38. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion) (“[The
PruneYard opinion’s] failure to speak separately to the claimed [judicial] taking . . . certainly
does not suggest that a taking by judicial action cannot occur, and arguably suggests that the
same analysis applicable to taking by constitutional provision would apply.”).
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reshuffle property rights within the existing framework of
entitlements defined by the prevailing configuration of the law. A
statute of the kind passed by South Carolina could constitute a taking
only after courts had accepted that the regulated use or interest
39
actually was property. As commentators note, both lower courts and
government defendants have increasingly focused their analysis on
background principles in post-Lucas takings cases. If a plaintiff enjoys
no property right in a regulated interest, the litigation will be defeated
at an early stage and the opportunity for a more involved inquiry into
whether and to what extent the regulated interest was indeed taken
40
will be foreclosed.
But the question of exactly what should qualify as a background
principle after Lucas, and, by extension, which types of inherent
limitations might circumscribe property ownership without the need
for compensation, has not been the object of any widespread
41
theoretical consensus beyond a few elementary propositions. To

39. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (“[W]e think [the state] may resist compensation only if the
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with.” (emphasis added)); see also Michael C. Blumm
& Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical
Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 325 (2005) (“Lucas thus elevated the task of
defining the relevant property interest—what some have referred to as the ‘denominator’
question—to the role of a threshold inquiry.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Frank I. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation”
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967))).
40. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 39, at 328 (suggesting that this “threshold inquiry”
allows courts to “reduce the amount of information that they must process” and enables the
government to obtain early dismissals of takings challenges); see also id. at 335 & nn.80–86
(collecting cases in which both state and federal courts have been receptive to government
takings defenses based on background principles).
41. The right of exclusion, at least, seems to be a central and uncontroversial feature of
most accounts of property in the takings context. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 4, at 970 (“The
statement . . . that the hallmark of property is the right to exclude others should be adopted as
part of the definition of property for takings clause purposes.”); Walston, supra note 33, at 404
(“In takings cases, the Supreme Court has held that ‘property’ is not a monolithic economic
interest, but instead is a ‘bundle of rights,’ the most important of which is the ‘right to
exclude’ . . . .” (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); PruneYard, 447 U.S.
at 82; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))). Although most commentators
appear to accept the notion that traditional common-law rules of nuisance will provide inherent
limitations on title, scholars are by no means in agreement as to how susceptible those rules
should be to modification or expansion by either courts or legislatures. Compare, e.g., Blumm &
Ritchie, supra note 39, at 336 (“Because nuisance law is continuously expanding, new
knowledge concerning the value of particular resources may bar liability for acts which have not
historically been considered to be common law nuisances.”), and Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 301, 316 (1993) (proposing that the capacity of common-law nuisance to change
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recognize the Takings Clause as supplying an independent constraint
on the antecedent judicial definition of property, then, might be to
thrust upon federal courts the novel and delicate responsibility of
discriminating between those portions of state court jurisprudence
that effect some affirmative change to the state’s property law and
those portions that represent merely an explication of the law. One
conceivable result, especially if federal courts were to carry out that
duty aggressively, could be the instillation in state judiciaries of a
greater reluctance to disturb or depart from established tenets of the
traditional common law, in much the same way that Justice Stevens
feared Lucas would dissuade legislatures from any attempt to revise
42
existing property entitlements.
Stop the Beach Renourishment thus invites reflection on how a
judicial takings doctrine might implicate Justice Stevens’s concern
about freezing the common law. Justice Scalia’s opinion did not
engage with this concern directly, but his discussion offered a helpful,
if incomplete, roadmap as to how the Court might choose to resolve
some important preliminary questions if it were to adopt a theory of
43
judicial takings more wholeheartedly. Before the problem can be
embarked upon in earnest, a brief exposition of Stop the Beach
Renourishment itself will be useful for understanding the types of
circumstances under which judicial takings claims might occur.

over time might itself be considered a background principle), with Huffman, supra note 6, at 27
(“[I]t is a distortion of the common law process to suggest that state courts and legislatures can
modify or abandon established common law principles in the name of present day notions of the
public interest and public rights.”). Nor do commentators entirely agree as to whether inherent
limitations on property rights might be derived from alternative sources of law in addition to
common-law nuisance doctrine. Compare, e.g., Walston, supra note 33, at 402–03 (“[T]he Lucas
Court appeared to embrace a general distinction between state common law—which normally
provides ‘background’ principles of law—and state legislative enactments, which normally do
not.”), with Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering Inherent
Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996) (arguing that background principles should
not be limited to the common law and may include statutes passed prior to a landowner’s
acquisition of property).
42. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens’s fear that Lucas
would erode the legislature’s traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of
property).
43. One line in the plurality opinion that might have contained the germ of a fuller
response to the criticism that a judicial takings doctrine would freeze the common law was
Justice Scalia’s comment that “in any case, courts have no peculiar need of flexibility.” Stop the
Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality opinion).
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B. Anatomy of a Claimed Judicial Taking
Ironically, the claimed judicial taking in Stop the Beach
Renourishment began not with an initial defeat for private-property
44
owners, but with an initial victory. Florida’s Beach and Shore
45
Preservation Act authorizes local governments, upon permission
from the state’s Department of Environmental Protection, to initiate
46
erosion-control projects along beachfront properties. These projects
frequently entail the addition of dry sand to permanently submerged
coastal lands, which are traditionally held in public trust by the
state—as opposed to the land above the mean high-water line, which
47
is owned by the private-property owners. In such situations,
pursuant to statute, Florida’s Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund established an “erosion-control line,” which
48
was typically identical to the preexisting high-water line. The
erosion-control line, once fixed by the Board, continued to define the
boundary between the state’s land and the private-property owner’s,
even if the state’s addition of dry sand to the previously submerged
lands moved the actual high-water line seaward: property upland of
the erosion-control line remained in the hands of the property owner,

44. See id. at 2600 (majority opinion) (describing the initial determination by the Florida
District Court of Appeal in Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, 27 So. 3d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), quashed sub nom. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010), that the plaintiff’s
waterfront-property rights had been taken).
45. Beach and Shore Preservation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.011–.45 (West 2006).
46. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.041(1)
(requiring “any person, firm, corporation, county, municipality, township, special district, or any
public agency” to obtain a permit from the Department of Environmental Protection before
undertaking erosion-control projects); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.101(1) (providing that the state
“may authorize appropriations to pay up to 75 percent of the actual costs for restoring and
nourishing a critically eroded beach,” but noting that the local government “shall be responsible
for the balance of such costs”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.161(1) (“The department shall develop
and maintain a comprehensive long-term management plan for the restoration and maintenance
of the state’s critically eroded beaches . . . .”).
47. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987) (acknowledging
Florida’s adoption of “the common law rule that a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of
the ordinary high water mark on navigable waters”).
48. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599. The Court and the parties simply
assumed for the purposes of the litigation that the erosion-control line in Stop the Beach
Renourishment had been set at the preexisting high-water line. Id. at 2599 n.2.
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and any newly created land on the seaward side of the line belonged
49
to the state.
The plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation comprising beachfront
landowners in the city of Destin whose properties abutted areas
50
designated for an erosion-control project. After an unsuccessful
administrative claim, the plaintiff brought a takings challenge in
Florida’s District Court of Appeal, claiming that the state’s
application of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act to the
landowners’
properties,
without
compensation,
would
unconstitutionally deprive them of two littoral rights that the plaintiff
argued had been traditionally conferred on beachfront landowners by
Florida’s common law: the right to enjoy any additions to their land
caused by the accretion of dry sand and the right to maintain
51
continuous contact between their property and the water. The
appeals court agreed with the plaintiff that the statute had
extinguished both of these rights unconstitutionally, and it remanded
the case to the Department of Environmental Protection for the
52
necessary eminent domain proceedings. The court also certified for
the Florida Supreme Court the question of the statute’s
53
constitutionality in light of the plaintiff’s takings claim.

49. Id. at 2599.
50. Id. at 2600.
51. Id. According to the Court, an “accretion” of sand is distinct from an “avulsion” in
Florida law, in that the former refers to a process that occurs “gradually and imperceptibly—
that is, so slowly that one could not see the change occurring, though over time the difference
became apparent,” whereas the latter describes alterations of the land caused by sudden and
noticeable events. Id. at 2598; see also Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d at 936 (defining accretion as
“the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land along the shore or bank of a body of
water” and avulsion as “the sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the
water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream”).
52. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006), quashed sub nom. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102
(Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592 (2010); see also Beach and Shore Preservation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.141 (West
2006) (requiring eminent domain proceedings if an erosion-control project “cannot reasonably
be accomplished without the taking of private property”).
53. The appeals court originally framed the question as an as-applied constitutional
challenge. Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 60–61. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the
question as a facial challenge, but it limited its analysis “to the context of restoring critically
eroded beaches under the Beach and Shore Preservation Act.” Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). The state court
proceedings apparently addressed the statute’s constitutionality not under the federal
Constitution but under the Florida constitution, which, as the Supreme Court later noted,
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The Florida Supreme Court concluded that no taking had
54
transpired. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the crucial
distinction between accretions and avulsions at Florida common law:
whereas littoral property owners had always been entitled to any
gradual additions to their land occasioned by the steady, sustained
process of accretion, more abrupt additions or diminutions—
avulsions—were understood not to alter the preexisting boundary
55
between state-owned and privately owned property. As a result, the
court reasoned, Florida case law made clear that a private owner
simply had no right to additions by avulsion to begin with, so the state
could legally claim whatever land surfaced seaward of the original
56
high-water line through avulsive events. The addition of dry sand to
submerged lands in the course of the state’s own erosion-control
efforts was to be treated merely as the manmade equivalent of a
natural avulsion, thereby placing the statute in harmony with
57
traditional principles of common law. As to the plaintiff landowners’
asserted right of contact between their land and the water, the court
explained that this entitlement had never been recognized as a
freestanding property right under Florida common law, but was
simply an ancillary benefit intended to protect a littoral owner’s right
58
to access the water, a right that the statute did not infringe. Having
thus satisfied itself that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act took
nothing that actually belonged to the plaintiff, the Florida Supreme
59
Court quashed the remand of the appeals court.
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision left the plaintiff in the
awkward position of wishing to pursue its takings claim in federal
60
court but of lacking a statute or executive action to challenge. The
contains a takings clause, FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6, cl. a, similar to that found in the Fifth
Amendment. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600 n.3.
54. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d at 1116.
55. Id. at 1116–17.
56. Id. at 1117.
57. See id. (“Like the common law doctrine of avulsion, the Act authorizes the State to
reclaim its storm-damaged shoreline by adding sand to submerged sovereignty lands.”).
58. See id. at 1120 (“[B]ecause the Act safeguards access to the water and because there is
no right to maintain a constant boundary with the water’s edge, the Act, on its face, does not
unconstitutionally eliminate the ancillary right to contact.”).
59. Id. at 1121.
60. The scenario would have more closely resembled a conventional takings claim if the
Florida Supreme Court had merely upheld the erosion-control law and denied compensation
without resorting to the rationale that the plaintiff landowners had never enjoyed their asserted
property rights in the first place. In that event, the plaintiff simply would have had a ripe claim
that either the statute or the state’s execution of the statute violated the Takings Clause. Cf.
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disagreement in the state courts had been not so much over the scope
or meaning of the regulation itself, but instead over whether the
regulated interests met the threshold definition of property—or, more
61
specifically, met the definition of the plaintiff’s property. The
plaintiff landowners’ only conceivable recourse, therefore, was to
argue that the Florida Supreme Court itself had extinguished their
property rights in violation of the Takings Clause by redefining as not
62
theirs something that previously had been theirs. Accordingly, the
landowners’ contention before the U.S. Supreme Court was that their
right to addition by accretion and their right to direct contact with the
63
water had been judicially eliminated.
In a decision endorsed by all eight deliberating Justices, the
Supreme Court sorted through the body of relevant Florida
precedents and unequivocally rejected that argument: the state
64
supreme court’s decision was a taking of neither such interest. The
asserted right to accretion, the Court explained, was limited by “[t]wo
65
core principles of Florida property law.” The first of these principles
was that “the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to
littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not
interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral
66
landowners.” And the second was that the state, not a private
landowner, is entitled to any new dry land created by an avulsion
seaward of the original boundary between state and private
67
property. The fact that the state’s erosion-control project itself was

FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 209–10 & n.7 (discussing the traditional ripeness requirements
for takings claims and offering Lucas, among other cases, as an instance in which the Court has
appeared to relax those requirements slightly).
61. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d at 1107–09 (summarizing relevant
provisions of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act); Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 52–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (providing a similar outline of the
statutory scheme), quashed sub nom. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998
So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
62. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2600 (2010) (“Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision itself effected a taking of the Members’ littoral rights . . . .” (emphasis added)).
63. Id. at 2610–11.
64. Id. at 2613.
65. Id. at 2611.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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the source of the avulsion in this case did not matter. The right to
accretion simply never entitled the plaintiff to any of the property
69
claimed by the state under the Beach and Shore Preservation Act.
The Court similarly agreed with the Florida Supreme Court that the
statute had not taken the property owners’ right to direct contact with
70
the water because no such right had ever existed. Thus, to the extent
that the state court’s decision was “consistent with . . . background
71
principles
of
state
property
law,”
it
had
not
72
“contravene[d] . . . established property rights” and could not be
considered a judicial taking.
Justice Breyer, in a concurrence joined by Justice Ginsburg,
made clear that he believed this brief consultation of Florida law was
all that should have been needed to reject the plaintiff’s claim; the
plurality’s further step of entertaining the extension of the Takings
Clause to state judicial decisions, he suggested, was not just
73
superfluous, but perilous. To Justice Scalia and the rest of the

68. Id. The Court supported this conclusion with an earlier Florida Supreme Court case in
which the state was held to retain ownership over a previously submerged lakebed that had
dried up following the state’s draining of the lake. See id. (citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274,
287 (Fla. 1927)).
69. See id. at 2612 (“[The Florida Supreme Court] did not abolish the Members’ right to
future accretions, but merely held that the right was not implicated by the beach-restoration
project, because the doctrine of avulsion applied.”).
70. The Court seemed to rely especially on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Martin
v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927), for the proposition that an avulsive event, even if caused by
the state itself, would not alter the preexisting boundaries between state-owned and privately
owned property. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (“Perhaps state-created
avulsions ought to be treated differently from other avulsions insofar as the property right to
accretion is concerned. But nothing in prior Florida law makes such a distinction, and Martin
suggests, if it does not indeed hold, the contrary.”). Curiously, the Florida Supreme Court had
made no mention of Martin. See id. (acknowledging that “the opinion does not cite Martin and
is not always clear on this point”).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2613.
73. See id. at 2618–19 (Breyer, J., concurring) (warning that the plurality’s approach, if
adopted by the Court, “would invite a host of federal takings claims without the mature
consideration of potential procedural or substantive legal principles that might limit federal
interference in matters that are primarily the subject of state law”). One doctrinal candidate for
refereeing judicial takings claims, proposed by the Florida government, would be to inquire
whether a state court property decision had a “fair and substantial basis,” an inquiry imported
from the Court’s adequate-and-independent-state-grounds jurisprudence. See id. at 2608
(plurality opinion) (discussing the “fair and substantial basis” standard). Justice Scalia and the
plurality appeared to reject this standard; Justice Breyer was agnostic. Compare id. (“A test
designed to determine whether there has been an evasion [of a federal-law ground] is not
obviously appropriate for determining whether there has been a taking of property.”), with id.

WHEELOCK IN PRINTER PROOF

448

10/13/2011 9:52:12 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:433

plurality, which included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas
and Alito, such a noncommittal position was a logical impossibility:
one could not dismiss a judicial takings challenge without either first
“knowing what standard it has failed to meet” or else disavowing the
74
existence of judicial takings altogether. Opting for the former task,
the plurality explained its view that the agreed-upon absence of any
judicial taking in this case ought not prevent the Court from affirming
the potential operation of the Takings Clause upon state judiciaries in
75
future cases. And thus, after concluding from both constitutional
76
77
text and precedent that the Fifth Amendment’s safeguard against
takings makes no distinctions as to which branch of government
performs the taking, the plurality announced what it regarded as the
proper formulation: “If a legislature or a court declares that what was
once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has
taken that property, no less than if the State had physically
78
appropriated it or destroyed its value by regulation.”
The plurality’s enlistment of the Takings Clause to rein in state
judicial decisions that destroy established property rights was
troubling to Justice Kennedy, who, in a concurrence joined by Justice
Sotomayor, contended that the same work could be done with equal
79
effectiveness by substantive or procedural due process. Justice
Scalia’s opinion rejected both possibilities outright: using procedural

at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I do not claim that all of these conclusions are unsound. I do
not know.”).
74. Id. at 2603 (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer’s willingness to reject the plaintiff’s claim
without confirming or denying the very possibility of a judicial taking was lampooned by the
plurality as “reminiscent of the perplexing question how much wood would a woodchuck chuck
if a woodchuck could chuck wood?” Id.
75. See id. (recounting instances in which the Court has “recognized the existence of a
constitutional right, or established the test for violation of such a right (or both), and then gone
on to find that the claim at issue fails”).
76. See id. at 2601 (“The Takings Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific
branch or branches.”).
77. See id. at 2601–02 (finding support for a judicial takings doctrine in PruneYard and
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)).
78. Id. at 2602.
79. See id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Due Process Clause, in both its
substantive and procedural aspects, is a central limitation upon the exercise of judicial power.”).
One consideration that seemed to give Justice Kennedy special pause was the possibility that
the Takings Clause might permit courts to undertake otherwise egregious redefinitions of
property rights so long as the compensation requirement were satisfied. See id. at 2616 (arguing
that the idea of judicial takings “would give judges new power and new assurance that changes
in property rights that are beneficial, or thought to be so, are fair and proper because just
compensation will be paid”).
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due process would “impose judicially crafted separation-of-powers
limitations upon the States” with no doctrinal foundation for any such
80
limitations, and using substantive due process would threaten to
“propel[] us back to what is referred to (usually deprecatingly) as ‘the
81
82
Lochner era.’” Scalia probably had the better of these exchanges,
but Kennedy’s concerns seemed tempered by an understandable
hesitancy to embark on a jurisprudential tack for which few
83
meaningful guideposts exist. Even assuming that Scalia was correct
84
that the Due Process Clause is ill suited to serve as an antitakings
instrument, at least the clause’s application to property interests is
85
more fully developed than any existing judicial takings doctrine.
After all, a reasonably perceptive reader of Stop the Beach
Renourishment’s plurality opinion may harbor some uncertainty as to
what standards the Court might adopt in future judicial takings cases,
beyond the bare assertion that destroying “an established right of
86
private property” without compensation is unconstitutional.
Judicial takings, then, is a concept in need of some elaboration.
Given the absence of Justice Stevens from Stop the Beach
Renourishment, appraising the potential of a judicial takings doctrine
to stagnate the development of the common law seems an
appropriate, if slightly quixotic, task. The first respect in which such a
doctrine might conceivably do so is by assigning a fixed, normative
meaning to property in the first instance, literally constitutionalizing a
87
common-law definition of property. A second possibility is that,

80. Id. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 2606.
82. One particularly potent sally was Justice Scalia’s remark that, under Justice Kennedy’s
procedural due process proposal, “the citizen whose property has been judicially redefined to
belong to the State would presumably be given the Orwellian explanation: ‘The court did not
take your property. Because it is neither politically accountable nor competent to make such a
decision, it cannot take property.’” Id. at 2605.
83. See id. at 2617–18 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is not wise, from an institutional
standpoint, to reach out and decide questions that have not been discussed at much length by
courts and commentators.”).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85. See id. at 2615 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and Board of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), as demonstrative of the Court’s treatment of
property rights under the Due Process Clause); cf. Merrill, supra note 4, at 934 (“The extensive
jurisprudence seeking to define property for procedural due process purposes has no
counterpart in the law arising under the Takings Clause.”).
86. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
87. For a classic iteration of the criticism that the Court has mistakenly prescribed the
common law as a constitutional baseline in various areas of its jurisprudence, including takings,
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even without officially endorsing any such definition as a
constitutional requisite, the Court might afford too little deference to
state court interpretations of property law when deciding takings
claims, especially in those hard cases in which the state-law
88
precedents are sparse, ambiguous, or conflicting. Each of these two
prospects warrants separate analysis, with special attention owed to
both the Court’s precedent in the takings realm and the specific
language employed by the plurality in Stop the Beach Renourishment.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES IN DEFINING PROPERTY:
POSITIVISM WITH A COMMON-LAW FAILSAFE?
As suggested by Lucas’s discussion of background principles,
courts evaluating takings claims will almost inevitably be forced to
grapple with the question of whether the object of an alleged taking is
indeed property and, if so, exactly how far the plaintiff’s interests in
89
that property originally extended. This question is commonly
90
treated as a threshold problem in a wide variety of takings cases, and
Stop the Beach Renourishment suggests that it will be routinely
91
encountered in the judicial takings context as well.
see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987). Professor
Sunstein contends that the chief sin of Lochner was its assumption that common-law rights
represented a genuinely neutral backdrop rather than the product of legal and political
judgments, an assumption that led the Court to treat any departure from common-law principles
or entitlements as constitutionally suspect. See id. at 874 (arguing that “[f]or the Lochner Court,
neutrality, understood in a particular way, was a constitutional requirement” and that
“[g]overnmental intervention was constitutionally troublesome, whereas inaction was not”).
Subsequent scholarship has reexamined Professor Sunstein’s central thesis, and has disputed
whether the Court in the Lochner era actually viewed the traditional common law as an
inviolable baseline. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19
(2003) (challenging the notion that Lochner proceeded from any desire to entrench the common
law as a constitutionally required status quo).
88. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1532–34 (identifying and discussing “at least three types
of legal indeterminacy” that may render the interpretation and demarcation of property rights
more difficult under state law).
89. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original
Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1639
(1988) (“Resolving the taking question . . . requires identifying a legitimate basis for choosing
one definition of private property over another.”).
90. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 39, at 326–27 (pointing out that courts have
conducted background-principles analyses as a threshold matter not only in cases of total loss of
economic value, but also in cases of permanent physical occupation and in cases of regulatory
action).
91. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (summarizing the relevant
background principles of Florida law that govern littoral property and finding the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision compatible with those principles).
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Regrettably, case law and commentators have failed thus far to
produce a uniform, reliable method for defining what qualifies as
92
property under the Takings Clause. The challenge in producing such
a method might be likened to that faced by Odysseus in charting a
93
course between Scylla and Charybdis. At one end of the spectrum
lies the prospect that Justice Stevens so feared: namely, that of
reading into the Constitution a single, static definition of property
94
derived from the traditional substance of the common law. At the
opposite end lies the possibility of adopting a purely positivist
conception of property, such that the term “property” in the Takings
Clause would represent little more than a placeholder for whatever
interests or entitlements a state government is willing to confer at any
given time, whether through the common law or through other
95
sources such as statutes. Each extreme is accompanied by its own
cluster of theoretical difficulties.

92. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1523 n.277 (“It is fair to say . . . that the question of
what property means in the takings context has not been rigorously analyzed by scholars and
judges—despite the fact that it would seem central to any formulation of a coherent takings
doctrine.”). But see Merrill, supra note 4, at 969 (arguing that the Court’s more recent
jurisprudence can plausibly be read to yield “a federal patterning definition for takings purposes
that would ask whether nonconstitutional sources of law confer an irrevocable right on the
claimant to exclude others from specific assets” (emphasis omitted)).
93. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. 12, ll. 81–136 (Robert Fagles trans., Viking 1996)
(portending the hero’s treacherous navigation between Scylla, the “yelping horror,” her many
fangs “armed to the hilt with black death,” and “awesome Charybdis,” who three times a day
“gulps the dark water down” before she vomits it up).
94. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 20–24 (1985) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2)
(proposing Blackstone’s formulation—under which property consists of exclusive control,
enjoyment, and transferability of one’s acquisitions without any outside interference—as the
most appropriate definition of property under the Constitution). As a corollary to enshrining a
Blackstonian, common-law conception of property, Professor Epstein’s position would allow the
exercise of the police power—and thus the exemption of the state from the requirement of
compensation—only in those instances in which government action is necessary to prevent a
common-law injury such as nuisance. See id. at 111 (“In a word, the police power gives the state
control over the full catalogue of common law wrongs involving force and misrepresentation,
deliberate or accidental, against other persons, including private nuisances.”).
95. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 949–50 (describing “pure positivism” as an entrenched
legacy of legal realism and characterizing it as the proposition that “[p]roperty means whatever
the nonconstitutional decisionmakers say it means, or whatever the nonconstitutional
decisionmakers choose legally to protect as a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’” (quoting Bd. of
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))).
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A. Problems with Adopting an Authorized Constitutional Definition
of “Property”
The Takings Clause does not, of its own force, foreclose the
possibility that the meaning of “property” might be defined according
96
to some fixed normative ideal. Professor Richard Epstein’s
preferred course, which would be to “take the meaning of private
97
property from ordinary usage,” is an elegant expression of the
98
normative model, one whose strength proceeds from its simplicity.
But the matter still remains that “ordinary usage” must be
determined along some lines. If originalism were to serve as the main
interpretive criterion, then property might mean no more than what it
99
meant under the common law at a certain historical moment. Such
an approach would almost certainly fail to extend a sufficient measure
of protection to an institution whose protean nature allows it to
assume as many novel configurations as human needs and ingenuity
100
will accommodate. If the Court instead annunciated a formulation
of constitutional property without any explicit historical anchor, it
might risk being seen as engaging in something resembling economic
101
substantive due process, or, perhaps even worse, as resurrecting the
102
discarded concept of a “federal general common law.”

96. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1523–24 (“The available shards of history could be used
to argue for either a positive definition or for a normative definition under which property
would be defined by the Constitution itself.”).
97. EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 23.
98. This simplicity would arguably spare the Court a great deal of time and effort in
attempting to extrapolate the precise scope of property rights from state law. See Thompson,
supra note 3, at 1524 (arguing that, under a normative definition of property, “it would be
unnecessary to determine what the law was and how, if at all, it has changed,” and that instead,
“[a]ny governmental action that significantly interferes with the normative constitutional image
of property would raise takings concerns”).
99. Indeed, one historical account of the Takings Clause advances the position that the
clause, as originally understood, actually provided less protection to private-property owners
than subsequent takings jurisprudence did, not more. See William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782,
785 (1995) (“Even after the establishment of a compensation requirement, it applied only to
interference with physical ownership, and government routinely acted in ways that diminished
the value of private property without providing compensation.” (emphasis added)).
100. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 945 (emphasizing the dynamic potential of property and
speculating that a historically static definition would frustrate efforts to solve modern
problems).
101. This notion seems to have been the basic thrust of Justice Marshall’s observations in
PruneYard, see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (warning against a return to the Lochner era), as well as Justice Stevens’s later
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The chance that a fully normative, fully prescriptive model of
property would gain any traction within a judicial takings doctrine
seems especially remote given the fact that positivism, at least in
name, has been the ascendant principle of constitutional property
since the Court’s decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
103
Roth. That case furnished the fundamental rule that property rights
“are not created by the Constitution,” but rather “are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
104
stem from an independent source such as state law.” Roth’s analysis
was confined to the meaning of property under the Due Process
Clause, but subsequent decisions such as Webb’s Fabulous
105
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith and Phillips v. Washington Legal
106
Foundation have confirmed its applicability to takings cases as
107
well. Even PruneYard indicated that the Court was unwilling to
commit to a strictly normative ideal of property under the Takings
Clause: refusing to find a per se taking when the California state
constitution’s right of free speech trumped a property owner’s right of
108
then-Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion accorded
exclusion,

objections in Lucas, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting verbatim the key passage of Marshall’s PruneYard concurrence).
102. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Michelman, supra note 41,
at 319–20 (suggesting that Justice Scalia’s Lucas decision flirted with the premise that “there is
just one American background law of property and nuisance . . . that is common to the national
jurisdiction and all the state jurisdictions,” but ultimately concluding that Lucas’s language
should not be read as presenting any threat to the Erie doctrine).
103. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
104. Id. at 577.
105. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
106. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
107. See id. at 164 (citing Roth for the proposition that “the Constitution protects rather
than creates property interests”); Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 161 (quoting Roth’s positivist mantra
directly); Thompson, supra note 3, at 1524 (“When faced directly with the question of whether
the takings protections embody a normative ideal of property independent of state law, . . . the
Court has repeatedly responded negatively.”); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. But
see Merrill, supra note 4, at 958 (arguing that the definition of property under the Takings
Clause is actually narrower and is closer to a traditional common-law formulation than the
definition of property under the Due Process Clause).
108. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–83 (1980). The Court’s decision in
PruneYard appeared to address only whether the California constitution itself performed the
equivalent of a legislative taking—not whether the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of
that constitution had so diverged from established precedent that the interpretation could be
classified as a taking. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1470 & n.89 (discussing the Court’s
confusion over precisely what kind of governmental action was at dispute in PruneYard). The
plurality in Stop the Beach Renourishment, of course, reads PruneYard as leaving open the
possibility that a state court decision might be enough at odds with state-law precedent as to
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virtually no weight to the fact that the plaintiff’s property had been
109
subject to a temporary physical invasion. The implication was that a
state should be considered free, within reasonable limits, to adopt
restrictions on property use that override traditional common-law
110
rationales such as nuisance prevention. Even setting aside the
theoretical and methodological shortcomings of a purely common-law
approach like Professor Epstein’s, the presumption that property is
essentially a creature of positive law occupies too conspicuous a place
in the Court’s jurisprudence to forecast its total repeal under any
111
potential judicial takings regime.
B. Hazards of the Positivist Method
If the Court has disclaimed any reliance on an entirely
substantive account of property when analyzing takings claims, it has
also hedged its commitment to positivism in a number of important
112
ways. To at least a limited extent, the very existence of the Takings
Clause would appear to require the adoption of some neutral baseline
definition of property; after all, if “property” were assumed to be an
infinitely malleable construct of positive law susceptible to “perpetual
113
legislative redefinition,” then it would be difficult to imagine how
114
property could ever truly be “taken” by government regulation.
Justice Marshall hinted at this problem in his PruneYard concurrence,
immediately after airing his qualms about freezing the common law,

constitute “taking by judicial action.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality opinion).
109. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84 (“In these circumstances, the fact that [protesters] may
have ‘physically invaded’ appellants’ property cannot be viewed as determinative.”). But see
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982) (positing a
“constitutional distinction between a permanent occupation and a temporary physical
invasion”).
110. Cf. Blais, supra note 41, at 50 & n.203 (“[S]tates, not the federal government, have
traditionally established the scope and limits of private property rights . . . .” (citing PruneYard,
447 U.S. at 84)). The question of whether a state judiciary can suddenly revise its interpretation
of the state constitution and be entirely free of takings liability is, of course, a separate matter.
111. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 943 (“The Roth axiom . . . has far too much gravitational
force for the Court to repudiate it entirely.”).
112. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1526 (arguing that the Court’s professed positivism
does not align with what is really “an amalgam of positivist and normative approaches”).
113. EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 65.
114. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 87, at 913 (“The takings clause . . . was built on a belief in
the meaning and importance of private property, and it would be difficult to read that clause in
the fashion of [West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),] without reading it out of
the Constitution.”).
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when he wrote that “serious constitutional questions might be raised
if a legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law
115
rights in some general way.” Carried to its extreme, the positivist
view also poses precisely the opposite hazard: that of transforming
practically every state-backed entitlement into a constitutionally
protected property right under the Takings Clause, including a great
many that never would have been recognized as property either at
116
traditional common law or in everyday experience. The Court’s
117
decision in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft provides
just one glimpse of this hazard. In that case, state judicial precedents
forbade public utilities from terminating service to a customer except
118
for cause. Those precedents, the Court held, conferred a protected
property interest upon customers in their utility services for due
119
process purposes.
Perhaps cognizant of the logical extremes of the positivist
method, the Court has sought solid ground that might help to rescue
property as both a meaningful and a manageable concept in the
takings arena. Far from conceding the dominance of positivism, these
cases have treated property as possessing discrete substantive
characteristics independent of the contours of state or even federal
law. To cite one notable example, Lucas’s establishment of a per se
takings rule for the deprivation of all economically beneficial use of

115. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 93–94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall may
actually have had the Due Process Clause in mind more than the Takings Clause, see id. at 93
(arguing that “life, liberty, and property” must not be defined solely in positivist terms), but his
point is germane to a discussion of takings nevertheless. In any event, Marshall agreed with the
Court’s holding that no core constitutional rights had been abrogated. Id. at 94. Professor
Epstein’s reasoning makes the case seem closer than the Court’s or Marshall’s opinion might
suggest. See EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 65–66 (disputing whether the freedom of speech “gives
the appellee the right to appropriate the land of another for his own use, any more than the
First Amendment gives a political candidate the right to use his neighbor’s telephone free of
charge”).
116. One term for this phenomenon is the “positivist trap,” which Professor Thomas Merrill
describes as springing up “whenever nonconstitutional law generates either too little property or
too much property relative to some independent norm that is important to the Court.” Merrill,
supra note 4, at 892.
117. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
118. Id. at 11–12.
119. Id.; cf. FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 488 (“[C]ould affording constitutional
protection to whatever entitlement a state creates, no matter how unimportant, give rise to a
flood of due process claims asserting the deprivation of quite trivial interests?”).
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land might best be read as an explicit reaction against the notion that
120
all property rights are enjoyed solely as a matter of legislative grace.
The per se rule for cases involving permanent physical
occupation adopted earlier in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
121
CATV Corp. similarly lines up on the normative rather than the
122
123
positivist side of the ledger. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, the
Court further indicated that the freedom from “severe retroactive
liability” may, in some cases, constitute a property interest that is
124
guarded by the Takings Clause. In that case, the Court held that a
1992 congressional statute that required the plaintiff company to pay
health benefits to workers it had employed decades earlier—despite
the fact that the company had agreed to no such obligation under the
125
original employment contracts—was a regulatory taking.
The holding of Eastern Enterprises gives reason to doubt that the
infinite mutability of the positive law might ever qualify as a
126
legitimate background principle of property rights. Indeed, it seems
to borrow more from a variation of Professor Epstein’s libertarian
thesis that “[a]ll regulations, all taxes, and all modifications of liability
rules are takings of private property prima facie compensable by the
127
state.” The Court’s scrutiny of retroactive liability in the takings
realm bespeaks a fundamentally normative conception of what
property ownership ought to mean, one that lies somewhere outside

120. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992) (arguing that although
a property owner in many settings may expect the use of his personal property to be revised or
restricted by the state from time to time, even to the point of total destruction of its economic
worth, real property is much too rooted in the “historical compact recorded in the Takings
Clause” to be subjected to any such “implied limitation” on its use and value).
121. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
122. See id. at 435 (asserting that in cases of permanent physical occupation of a plaintiff’s
property, “the government does not simply take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property
rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand”).
123. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
124. Id. at 528.
125. Id. at 503–04; Merrill, supra note 4, at 900–01.
126. Professor Frank Michelman, writing in response to Lucas, speculates whether, on
remand, the state court might be able to invoke the common law’s inherent capacity for change
as a suitable justification for dismissing a takings claim when government action made unlawful
what had previously been lawful. See Michelman, supra note 41, at 316–17 (imagining a possible
remand decision hinging on the malleability of state property law). As Professor Barton
Thompson points out, however, even before Lucas the Court had “never suggested that the
government can protect itself against a regulatory takings claim simply by reserving the general
right to reallocate property rights.” Thompson, supra note 3, at 1529.
127. EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 95.
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128

the currents of the positive law. It is also consonant with the Court’s
prior disavowal of purely conditional property interests under the
Due Process Clause, itself a maneuver designed to resist the corrosive
dangers of all-out positivism by undergirding constitutional property
129
with some independent content.
Finally, also in the due process context, the Court has sought a
means to avoid generating too much property using the positivist
route. By asserting, in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
130
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, that “[t]he hallmark of a
131
protected property interest is the right to exclude others,” the Court
announced a tenet that creates tension with Roth’s positivist regime,
and that might even erect a bar against certain kinds of state-law
132
entitlements that otherwise would have passed muster.
C. The Definitional Approach of Stop the Beach Renourishment
Against this slightly muddled jurisprudential background, some
intelligible patterns can be extracted from Justice Scalia’s majority
and plurality opinions in Stop the Beach Renourishment. The first is
the Court’s official fidelity to positivism, announced in its opening
statement that “[g]enerally speaking, state law defines property
133
interests,” and further advanced by its nuanced exegesis of Florida
statutory and case law to determine the extent of the plaintiff
134
landowners’ antecedent littoral ownership rights. A similar attitude
is revealed in the plurality’s refusal to follow Justice Kennedy’s
recommendation to use substantive due process rather than the
135
Takings Clause to rein in judicial redefinitions of property. That

128. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 951 (describing Eastern Enterprises as “endors[ing]
substantive limitations on the meaning of property without making any reference at all to Roth’s
positivist strategy”).
129. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1529 n.301 (acknowledging the Court’s rejection, in
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), of the “bitter with the sweet”
thesis originally espoused by then-Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)).
130. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
131. Id. at 673.
132. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 913–14 (noting the potential dissonance between the
Court’s reasoning in College Savings Bank and the positivist logic behind the “new property”).
133. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597
(2010) (citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998)).
134. See id. at 2598–2600, 2611–13 (summarizing the Beach and Shore Preservation Act and
parsing Florida precedent regarding the rights to accretions and avulsions).
135. See id. at 2606 (plurality opinion) (rejecting the use of substantive due process instead
of the Takings Clause).
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refusal suggests a reluctance to register any definitive
pronouncements on exactly what, if any, normative image of property
is required by the Constitution. If the plurality had truly been
interested in erecting some preferred common-law baseline, it
probably would not have been so careful to avoid the appearance of
136
The
reviving a Lochner-style economic-libertarian approach.
Court’s reflexive positivism is summarized perhaps most pithily in
Scalia’s remark that, even if a more exotic reading of Florida cases
might produce a more desirable result, the Court was not free to
pursue it because “[t]he Takings Clause only protects property rights
as they are established under state law, not as they might have been
137
established or ought to have been established.” In theory, then, the
decision should have required nothing more than a straightforward
explication of Florida precedents.
At several points in Stop the Beach Renourishment, however, the
Court appeared to gather authority from sources beyond Florida’s
positive law to define the property interests at stake. When discussing
the littoral owner’s antecedent right to accretion, for instance, the
majority opinion noted that Florida’s rule is “generally in accord with
well-established common law” and cited two early twentieth-century
138
treatises on eminent domain and water rights. A similar volume
from the nineteenth century was employed later in this same
139
discussion. And when the Court explained that in Florida, “as at
common law,” avulsions do not result in changes in title, the Court
140
cited none other than William Blackstone himself.
Although these citations do not, ultimately, do much work for
the Court’s analysis—Florida court decisions occupy a far greater
portion of the Court’s attention in Stop the Beach Renourishment
than any learned treatises—under a purely positivist regime, such

136. The plurality’s rejection of the substantive due process option may have been
motivated more by the simple fact that precedent foreclosed reading economic rights into the
Due Process Clause and less by a desire to flaunt its positivist bona fides. But even if the
plurality’s nod to the perils of “the Lochner era,” id., was only a rhetorical move, it was still a
rhetorical move away from, and not toward, a normative ideal of property.
137. Id. at 2612 (majority opinion).
138. Id. at 2598 (citing 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 62 (1904); 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES § 100 (3d ed. 1909)).
139. Id. at 2599 (citing JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS,
INCLUDING RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN WATERS TIDAL AND
INLAND § 158 (1883)).
140. Id. at 2598 (citing 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *261–62).
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references to general common law ought not to appear at all. The
most innocuous explanation is that these sources, although not strictly
necessary to decide the takings claim, do serve a useful purpose in
helping the Court to check its work—that is, they ensure that the
Court’s reading of Florida’s property law is not grossly aberrant from
the historical arc of legal thought. A more subversive possibility, one
likely to activate Justice Stevens’s alarm in Lucas, is that the Court
might actively be using these independent common-law authorities to
curb the very meaning of Florida precedent; and that, if Florida
precedent actually were too dissonant with a Blackstonian definition
of property for the Court’s taste, then the Blackstonian definition
itself might be called upon to do work in place of the state’s positive
law.
D. The Possibility of a Failsafe
In its efforts to define property, the Court is likely to fashion a
role for independent common-law principles that falls somewhere in
between active engagement and passive comparison with state-law
precedents. The majority and plurality’s positivist mechanics in Stop
the Beach Renourishment—the citation to Phillips, the close reading
of Florida cases, the rejection of substantive due process—are simply
too forthright and too convincing for any portion of Justice Scalia’s
opinions to be read as demonstrating a willingness to discard the
state’s antecedent rules for defining property. But judicial takings
claims are most likely to arise when a state’s background principles
141
are either ambiguous or in conflict. In such cases, if the threshold
question of a plaintiff’s original property interests still demands
resolution, the Court might be tempted to borrow common-law
norms from outside the relevant jurisdiction as a kind of
jurisprudential gap-filler.
Indeed, something resembling this approach has appeared
before, in the ostensibly positivist decisions of Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies and Phillips. Both cases involved state regulation that
asserted public ownership of the interest accrued on private
accounts—in the former, an interpleader fund holding the purchase

141. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1531–32 (highlighting the inevitable indeterminacy of
positive law and explaining that in judicial takings cases, state courts typically will not see
themselves as changing the law “so much as clarifying the intent of prior cases, resolving
inevitable conflicts between separate lines of cases, clearing away confusion and
misunderstanding, or applying preexisting principles to new settings or conditions”).
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142

price of an insolvent corporation, and in the latter, Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal accounts into which attorneys had temporarily
143
deposited their clients’ funds. Both cases involved state laws that
yielded no ready answers to the question of who ought to own the
144
interest.
And in both cases, the Court sought to escape the
muddiness of the positive law by grasping for an old common-law
chestnut: the rule that ownership of interest follows ownership of the
145
principal. Because the principal in each case belonged indisputably
to the private parties, the Court concluded that the interest was, by
146
default, private, and not public, property.
Webb’s and Phillips thus raise the possibility that, in takings
cases, the Court might consult the substance of some general common
law, not as a true alternative to the positive law, but rather as a
failsafe for those moments when positivism runs dry. How eagerly the
Court might retreat to that failsafe is a separate matter, one whose
resolution depends on the level of trust it is willing to place in the
ability of state courts to decide novel property-law issues reliably and
fairly. Stop the Beach Renourishment volunteers no explicit treatment
of that question, chiefly because Florida law on littoral rights
147
appeared to be neither ambiguous enough nor divergent enough
148
from broader common-law doctrines to supply the Court with any
reason for abandoning its official positivism. Justice Scalia’s
discussion does, however, offer some helpful clues for predicting how
trusting the Court might be in the future.

142. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 157–59 (1980).
143. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 161–63 (1998).
144. In Webb’s, the problem seemed to be an outright dearth of state court decisions on the
matter. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1538 (“[T]here was no prior state precedent addressing
whether the interest at issue was private property . . . .”). In Phillips, the situation was slightly
trickier, but equally unexplored by precedent: the interest allegedly taken by the state had
accrued on funds that, absent the state action being challenged, would never have been allowed
to generate any interest in the first place. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 896 (“Phillips presented
something of a brainteaser of an issue: whether the fruits of X’s property that may only be
enjoyed by Y are nevertheless the property of X.”).
145. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165; Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 162.
146. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172; Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 164–65.
147. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2611 (2010) (citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 287 (Fla. 1927), to illustrate that the
doctrine of avulsion applies even when the state itself is the cause of the avulsion).
148. See, e.g., id. at 2598 (finding Florida’s distinction between accretion and avulsion
generally in accord with that described in 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *261–62).
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III. THE PROCEDURAL CHALLENGE IN REVIEWING STATE
JUDICIAL ACTION: DISCIPLINE OR DEFERENCE?
As already noted, judicial takings claims, insofar as they might be
cognizable after Stop the Beach Renourishment, are most likely to
occur at the margins of the established property law, where rights as
between parties are not clearly defined or understood but where the
state court has nevertheless been forced to decide in favor of one
149
party and against the other. The crucial question for the Court in
reviewing these claims—even presupposing a vigorously positivist
outlook on the Court’s part—will be whether the state court decision
is better read as working a genuine change in the positive law, which
would amount to an uncompensated taking under the logic of the
150
Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality,
or instead as simply
offering an accurate, reasonable extension of the existing law to the
151
facts at hand, which would not. Given the potential malleability of
152
the law under a purely positivist system, this question will rarely be
153
easy to answer. If judicial takings cases are to be accepted and
154
decided by the Court on any predictable or principled basis, some

149. See supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 118
(“[L]itigation exerts powerful forces to select the most difficult cases for adjudication, no matter
what the underlying standard.”). In this sense, Stop the Beach Renourishment may not be so
typical of judicial takings claims, since it demanded little more than a parsing of precedents that
were relatively plentiful and uncomplicated. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text.
150. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality opinion) (“It is no more
essential that judges be free to overrule prior cases that establish property entitlements than
that state legislatures be free to revise pre-existing statutes that confer property
entitlements . . . .”).
151. See id. at 2610 (“A decision that clarifies property entitlements (or the lack thereof)
that were previously unclear might be difficult to predict, but it does not eliminate established
property rights.” (emphasis added)).
152. See supra Part II.B.
153. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1537 (noting that the reviewing court in a judicial
takings claim will “almost always have to face a claim by the state court that its new decision is
within the boundaries of prior legal doctrine” and suggesting that positivism, if adopted in its
purest form, will make it “exceptionally difficult to disagree with the state court”).
154. Uncertainty as to what constitutes a judicial change in the property law is likely to
impose a considerable psychological burden on property holders in general. See id. at 1479–80
(describing the demoralization caused by “loose ends” in decisions affecting property rights). It
may also disadvantage poorer or underrepresented citizens, who might be less capable of
pressuring state courts to leave their property interests alone than more politically influential
groups. Id. at 1494.
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“procedural limitations or canons of deference” are required, to
155
borrow from Justice Breyer’s concurrence.
The choice before the Court is best expressed as a tradeoff
between instilling a high level of discipline in state courts in their
reading of precedent and expressing a high degree of deference to
those courts. Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion, discussing the state
court’s interpretation of background principles, seemed to stake out a
middle ground. It left room for some flexibility in the development of
the state’s common law—acknowledging that “changed circumstances
or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no
156
longer so” —but it also sought to cabin that flexibility with its later
insistence that the state judiciary’s application of case law must be an
157
“objectively reasonable” one. As discussed in this Part, Stop the
Beach Renourishment similarly contained contrasting signals, ones
that stacked up on different sides of the scale. Which signals end up
being the most closely heeded may determine the Court’s future
judicial takings jurisprudence, if it indeed has one.
A. Abandoning Unpredictability
One signal that may allay Justice Stevens’s criticism of freezing
the common law is the plurality’s rejection of the plaintiff’s proposed
“unpredictability” standard as the basis for knowing when a judicial
158
That standard, borrowed from Justice
taking has occurred.
159
Stewart’s 1967 concurrence in Hughes v. Washington, would have
declared as a judicial taking any state court decision that
“constitute[d] a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of
160
Justice Scalia’s objection was that this
relevant precedents.”
standard would be both overinclusive and underinclusive: some state
court decisions might be unpredictable without eliminating property
155. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring). But see id. at
2608 n.9 (plurality opinion) (contending, in response to Justice Breyer, that the Court must
make independent determinations of “state-court compliance with all constitutional
imperatives” and that, in any case, the plurality’s standard for judicial takings does allow
deference to state courts).
156. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992); see also Blumm & Ritchie,
supra note 39, at 336 (exploring Lucas’s accommodation of an “evolving nuisance” takings
defense).
157. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18; see also supra text accompanying note 34.
158. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
159. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
160. Brief of Petitioner at 17, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151),
2009 WL 2509219, at *17 (citing Hughes, 389 U.S. at 296 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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rights, and some judicial eliminations of property rights might not be
161
unpredictable.
This response displays a keen recognition of the hard legal
questions with which state courts will usually be confronted at the
time most judicial takings claims are conceived. After all, in the
marginal property cases that are most likely to spur subsequent
takings litigation, a state court will not easily know whether it is
162
dealing with an “established right of private property” specifically
because the meaning of relevant precedents is so difficult to
163
decipher. Removing the unpredictability test will likely allow the
court to focus on reaching the best result in the dispute at hand,
rather than forcing it to agonize over whether that result really
amounts to a sudden development in light of sparse or muddled
164
Alternatively, the Stop the Beach Renourishment
precedents.
plurality does not stand for the proposition that all such close calls are
beyond reproach; indeed, its affirmation that federal courts retain
165
“the power to decide what property rights exist under state law”
indicates that at least some portion of state property decisions might
be subjected to something approaching de novo review when
166
challenged under the Takings Clause.
B. State-Level Separation of Powers?
A rather curious signal in the direction of judicial discipline
comes from the plurality’s brief consideration of remedies. One of
Justice Kennedy’s concerns about recognizing judicial takings was
that state courts might actually revise property entitlements more
aggressively because the reviewing court’s only weapon would be to
mandate compensation, effectively turning the state legislature into
161. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
162. Id. at 2602.
163. See supra notes 88, 141.
164. Indeed, the plurality seemed to believe that relying on unpredictability as the sole
benchmark of a judicial taking might discourage state courts from bringing needed resolution to
ambiguities in the existing property law. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610
(plurality opinion) (drawing a distinction between a mere clarification of the law and a judicial
elimination of established property rights).
165. Id. at 2609.
166. The plurality opinion intimated that certain questions of state property law might
simply be so difficult as to place the state court decisions effectively beyond aggressive federal
review. See id. at 2608 n.9 (discussing the trouble with finding property rights to be
“established” when state law is unclear). But it did not offer any elaboration on when those
situations might be said to arise.
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an involuntary underwriter for the state judiciary’s revisions. Justice
Scalia disagreed: the reviewing court’s response, he wrote, should be
simply to overturn the offending state court decision, leaving the
power to effect a compensated taking exclusively in the hands of the
168
legislature, “where it has always resided.”
Although this exchange technically bore on the question of how
to redress a judicial taking, not on whether a judicial taking has
occurred in the first place, the plurality’s rejoinder to Justice Kennedy
nevertheless bespoke an unmistakable vision of the proper
assignment of functions among the different branches of government.
Ironically, that vision is strikingly similar to the very approach the
plurality refused to entertain under the Due Process Clause: a strict
separation of state governmental authority, under which “courts
cannot be used to perform the governmental function of
169
expropriation.”
Of all the potential options that might be pursued by a reviewing
170
court upon a finding of a judicial taking, the option advanced by the
plurality is likely the least hospitable to the idea that courts ought to
be afforded special latitude in refashioning the law to meet changed
171
circumstances. Indeed, the plurality’s attitude is far more closely
aligned with the position that the Takings Clause contemplates a
172
careful balancing of utilities by the legislature alone and that state
courts as an institution are in no legitimate position to change the
173
common law at all. State judges might easily feel constrained in the
belief that the Court favored such a view.

167. Id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 2607 (plurality opinion).
169. Id. at 2605.
170. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1513–22 (examining the remedies conceivably available
to state courts and reviewing courts, including “automatic compensation” and “legislative
choice”).
171. See generally Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 39 (chronicling the expansion by state
courts of numerous common-law doctrines—including nuisance, public trust, natural use,
navigational servitude, customary rights, water rights, wildlife trust, and Indian treaty rights—to
dismiss Takings Clause challenges).
172. See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, Public Use, and the Perfect Storm: An Essay in
Honor of Bernard H. Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 620 (2008) (“[The Fifth Amendment’s
compensation requirement] disciplines government behavior by forcing taxpayers to make
honest evaluations of whether they receive from acquiring public ownership a benefit
commensurate with the costs that they impose . . . .”).
173. See Huffman, supra note 6, at 23 (“The common law is a formalization of custom,
meant to evolve as custom evolves, not as judges’ preferences change.”).
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C. The Plaintiff’s Burden
Forbidding state courts to change the common law, however, is a
meaningful stricture only when the law is developed enough that an
observer can confidently tell when a change has been made. In areas
in which the law is indeterminate, state courts are likely to reap the
benefits of what is perhaps the strongest procedural signal sent in
Stop the Beach Renourishment, not just by the plurality but by the
entire Court: namely, its description of the proper burden of
persuasion in judicial takings cases. The plaintiff contended that a
judicial taking must be found by the Court unless the Florida
government could produce some precedent that directly authorized
the state to embark upon an uncompensated erosion-control
174
Disagreeing, the Court clarified that the correct
project.
formulation was precisely the contrary: the judicial takings claim
would not prevail unless the plaintiff could show that, prior to the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision, the landowners had enjoyed the
175
specific property rights that were allegedly taken. In other words,
judicial takings plaintiffs must persuade the reviewing court that the
state’s positive law was, essentially, unambiguous before the
complained-of action—and furthermore, that it was unambiguous in
the direction of investing them with intelligible property rights.
This principle, if honestly applied in future cases, has the
potential to bestow a significant degree of flexibility on state courts
176
interpreting property law at the margins. Such flexibility might even
be enough to bring some comfort to an observer as worried about
“[a]rresting the development of the common law” as Justice Stevens
177
Admittedly, in situations involving a traditional, widely
was.
recognized form of property, the plaintiff will have little trouble
174. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610–11 (summarizing the plaintiff’s
theory that a taking had been committed “because no prior Florida decision had said that the
State’s filling of submerged tidal lands could have the effect of depriving a littoral owner of
contact with the water and denying him future accretions”).
175. See id. at 2611 (“There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision [in this proceeding], littoral-property owners had rights to future
accretions and contact with the water superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged land.”).
176. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion embraced this very hypothesis, arguing that the
plurality’s proposed test for a judicial taking—“deprivation of an established property right”—
accorded “a considerable degree of deference to state courts.” Id. at 2608 n.9. This deference,
Scalia reasoned, was derived from the fact that “[a] property right is not established if there is
doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make our own assessment but
accept the determination of the state court.” Id.
177. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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demonstrating the prior existence of the property interest. But in
many cases, particularly those involving more novel forms of property
179
or more innovative arrangements of property ownership, the law
will be a frontier, devoid of any clear directive as to where the
180
boundaries between various parties’ rights should fall. If the Court’s
unequivocal placement of the burden on the plaintiff in Stop the
Beach Renourishment is to be believed, then state courts may rest
easier in the knowledge that their labor of bringing order to the
unsettled vanguards of property law is sheltered by some procedural
deference on review.
Ultimately, the signals issued in Stop the Beach Renourishment
are still only signals, and they furnish at best an incomplete forecast
of how aggressive the Court will be in judging whether state courts
are changing the law or merely clarifying it. Many more procedural
questions remain to be worked out in the event that the Court decides
181
to begin accepting judicial takings claims more forthrightly. But
certain signals at least give reason for supposing that a judicial takings
doctrine would not, by itself, freeze the common law in its current
condition.

178. Cf. id. at 1016 n.7 (majority opinion) (explaining that the fee simple interest “is an
estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law”).
179. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
180. Webb’s and Phillips, both of which demanded judicial resolution as to the ownership of
interest on special funds, provide ready examples of cases in which the specific property-law
questions at issue simply had not been plumbed by any prior court decision. See supra note 144
and accompanying text.
181. One such question is how the burden of persuasion announced by the Court in Stop the
Beach Renourishment squares with Lucas’s proviso that the onus is on the state to make a
showing that the background principles of property law place inherent limitations on the
plaintiff’s title. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1031–32 (requiring South Carolina to demonstrate precedent
prohibiting the plaintiff’s use of his property). This proviso has generally been understood to
fashion background principles into an affirmative defense for the government in takings claims.
See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 39, at 326–27 (interpreting Lucas as requiring the government
to use background principles as an affirmative defense rather than as placing the burden on the
claimant). But if, under Stop the Beach Renourishment, the plaintiff must initially show the
existence of a property right under state law, then background principles will no longer be an
affirmative defense for the government, in the sense that raising the affirmative defense will
have become exactly the same thing as refuting the plaintiff’s case in chief: both the plaintiff and
the defendant will be arguing that background principles yield the favored view of property
rights.
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CONCLUSION
When reduced to its essence, the plurality’s recognition of
judicial takings in Stop the Beach Renourishment is probably no more
than a truism, and a fairly inoffensive one at that: when presented
with the claim that a plaintiff’s property has been taken for public use
without just compensation, state courts may not play fast and loose
with the law of property and whittle away the very thing the plaintiff
seeks to defend. To adopt any other position might threaten to turn
the Takings Clause into a dead letter, or even to abandon the very
notion of the rule of law.
But commentators would not be indulging in a groundless
fantasy to fear that a judicial takings doctrine, if too haphazardly
applied, might stunt the development of property law in state courts
and lead toward an outright constitutionalization of the common law.
This Note seeks to develop a plausible theoretical explanation for
how and why such a consequence might flow from judicial takings in
practice. The freezing of the common law could first assume a
substantive dimension if the Court were to insist on a specific
normative baseline as inhering in the definition of property under the
Takings Clause. And secondly, it could assume a procedural
dimension if, even in the absence of any such baseline, the Court were
to maintain a particularly low threshold for determining that a state
judicial decision actively changes, rather than merely explicates, the
law of property. Substantively, the reign of positivism is likely to
continue in cases involving an abundance of clear, thorough state
precedents. In less settled areas, the Court may be tempted to enlist
independent common-law norms. Procedurally, state judiciaries are
unlikely to receive much deference or sympathy for the premise that
common-law judging requires the flexibility to contradict previous
case law, but they may at least receive the benefit of the doubt when
that case law is so ambiguous that the extent of the plaintiffs’
property interests is functionally an open question.
A workable judicial takings doctrine will require the Court to
bring its slightly contrasting substantive and procedural attitudes into
equipoise. When state positive law is scarce or nonexistent, for
instance, should the Court invoke a Blackstonian failsafe and move
forward with its judicial takings analysis, or should the takings claim
instead simply stand or fall on the plaintiff’s ability to tease a property
right out of the state’s judicial tea leaves? Stop the Beach
Renourishment probably tilts toward the latter option, but the Court’s
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ratification of the former is not beyond imagination. Such conflicts
will arise, and must be resolved, where they nearly always are: on the
margins. The Court’s choices along those outer boundaries may well
decide the future of the common law of property. Either it will
become arrested and entrenched, anchored permanently to a static
ideal, or it will continue to move with the tide of human experience,
sculpted gradually but surely by the dozens, even hundreds, of
imperceptible additions and subtractions of precedent, “like every
182
sparrow falling, like every grain of sand.”

182. BOB DYLAN, Every Grain of Sand, on SHOT OF LOVE (Columbia Records 1981).

